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Abstract: Behavioral research on natural resource management has revealed a number of variables that can impact collective action. This
research builds upon an interactive decision game using experimental economics methods with a focus on production decisions and the
corresponding impact they have on ambient water quality. Using hierarchical clustering algorithms, four primary types of behavior are
identified: competitive, hypercompetitive, cooperative, and hypercooperative. The results from the experiment are used to test the following
three hypotheses: (1) financial incentives increase cooperative behavior, (2) increasing the number and frequency of water quality sensors
increases cooperative behavior, and (3) the spatial location of the agents and sensors affect cooperative behavior. Mixed-effect multinomial
logistic models reveal that policy incentives, sensor location, and frequency of sensing alter the behavioral strategies of decision makers in the
experiment and that outcomes vary by spatial location. From a watershed planning perspective, minimal investments in advanced environmental monitoring/sensing systems can potentially have large effects in improving water quality; however, there is also some evidence of
marginal diminishing returns associated with such investments. DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)WR.1943-5452.0001242. This work is made available under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
Author keywords: Behavioral change; Experimental economics; Hierarchical clustering; Incentive mechanisms; Nash equilibria; Policy
designs; Sensor information; Watershed management; Cyberinfrastructure development.

Introduction
Policymakers and watershed managers now have the potential to
invest in adopting advanced environmental monitoring systems
and sensor networks as a way to respond to the risks posed by
the impact of human activities. In assessing the benefits of such technologies, however, the role of human behavior, in particular strategic
behavioral adaptation to the sensor locations, needs to be explicitly

taken into account. Over the last decade, there has been tremendous
progress in the development and application of in situ optical water
quality sensors, a promising tool for advancing understanding of
the behavior of aquatic systems at finer temporal and spatial scales
(Downing et al. 2012). The critical premise underlying the application of advanced optical sensors to watershed studies is that such
sensors can frequently and comparably measure a suite of biochemical and geochemical parameters (i.e., diesel oxidation catalysts,
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nitrates, and particle loads) in concert over long periods of time.
Consequently, their potential for use in some settings is limited only
by the capability of the technology to function in the environment
and measure relevant parameters accurately and consistently.
These sensors have demonstrated their potential to help increase
understanding of water quality and aquatic ecosystem functions
in the context of local land management (Pellerin et al. 2009;
Florsheim et al. 2011), hydrochemical evolution in river networks
during storms (Saraceno et al. 2009), mobility of atmospheric
pollutants (Bergamaschi et al. 2012), downstream solute processing
(Hernes et al. 2008; Kraus et al. 2010), and diurnal to seasonal
biochemical and geochemical behaviors (Pellerin et al. 2012). Furthermore, development of larger-scale regional advanced sensor
networks holds tremendous promise in enhancing understanding
of the effects of regional drivers of aquatic ecosystems, which include climate disturbances, droughts, and even long-term regional
environmental change (Groisman et al. 2004; Kaushal et al. 2010).
Despite these advances in the understanding of ecosystem
behavior (Rode et al. 2016), critical knowledge gaps exist with
respect to understanding the social and policy implications of
instituting sensor networks, which need to be investigated with experimental and field research, ideally with a watershed management and policy design perspective. Improved understanding of
the precision, location, and frequency of sensor data effects on human behavior may inform local and regional adaptive watershed
management practices (Huang and Xia 2001; Lu et al. 2015;
Waylen et al. 2019) and enable calibration and validation of
regional integrated assessment models (Zia et al. 2016). This study
is an initial attempt to identify the extent to which investments in
environmental monitoring systems coupled with appropriate finetuning of environmental policy designs impact human behavior.
This paper builds upon the premise that the ability to understand, tune, and adjust incentives and environmental information
available to decision makers can provide testable opportunities
for governance of human–environmental systems. Improved understanding of human behavioral responses to such tunable conditions
may enable iterative and adaptive adjustment of environmental policy designs because whether individuals and organizations cooperate or act selfishly affects the performance of environmental
policy (Madani and Lund 2011; Giuliani et al. 2014; Norton 2015;
Yu et al. 2019).
Specifically, this study assesses human behavior related to
non-point-source pollution, an important contributor to water pollution, using the results of a laboratory economics experiment that
combines sensor data information and financial incentive treatments. The data allow for exploring the extent to which an observational water quality sensor network combined with financial
incentives determine whether agents behave cooperatively or noncooperatively in the decisions that they make related to water pollution. Observational sensor networks are an important ingredient
in adaptive management of social ecological systems (SES)
(Staudinger et al. 2013). This study broadly seeks to contribute toward an improved understanding of the impacts of observational
sensor networks on human behavior through economics experiments that get to the core of the water-resource-related decisionmaking process of non-point-source polluters.
The present study is motivated by the idea that designs for environmental policies and investments in the deployment of water
quality sensors can be the most effective when they are informed
by accurate information about human behavioral responses
generated using spatially explicit marginal incentives. This study
develops a non-point-source pollution control game to examine decisions that impact water quality and the effects of those decisions
on nutrient fluxes. Different from existing works that study average
© ASCE

treatment effects on production levels (e.g., Miao et al. 2016),
this study investigates varying treatment effects associated with
different sensing and incentive regimes on heterogeneous agent
behavior, especially the effect on inducing cooperative behavior.
Specific behavioral types, including cooperative behavior, are
identified using cluster analysis. Mixed-effects multinomial
logistic (MMNL) modeling is then used to analyze how specific
treatment conditions impact the behavioral types, which allows
specific behavioral hypotheses related to water quality to be
addressed.
The study provides a more comprehensive understanding of
heterogeneity of human behavior and new insight into how monitoring and policy differentially influence behavior types. Here,
cooperative behavior is defined as the adoption of decisions that
reduce non-point-source pollution below the predicted Nash equilibrium, which is based on strictly self-interested behavior. The
placement and frequency of sensors may impact cooperative behavior in a watershed because they change the incentives of agents
under a policy mechanism that uses the information from the sensors to determine taxes and subsidies. Spatial and location-based
effects of water quality sensor information are tested by changing
the effective costs of polluting through a penalty (tax) and reducing
the costs of taking an action through a reward (subsidy) for inducing cooperative behavior via three hypotheses (formally defined in
Supplemental Materials S1.1):
1. Incentives induce cooperative behavior among agents.
2. Increasing the number of water quality sensors as well as their
sensing frequency increases cooperative behavior.
3. The spatial locations of the agents relative to the spatial locations of the sensors, i.e., upstream, midstream, or downstream,
affect the induction of cooperative behavior.

Methods
Experiment Design
Non-point-source water pollution is characterized by individual
agents whose behavior impacts downstream water quality conditions, but the pollution contribution of any one agent cannot be
accurately determined. The design of the experiment is motivated
by a situation where a regulator seeks to reduce damages caused by
water pollution generated by a group of producers situated along a
river reach, where the pollution contribution of each individual producer cannot be detected. This section presents important highlights of the basic design and the experimental treatments that
define the implemented experimental game. The Supplemental
Material presents the complete technical details of the game design
(also discussed by Miao et al. 2016). The theoretical decision
framework that underlies the experiment is based on Segerson
(1988)’s non-point-source pollution model, and the basic payoff
functions and parameters are similar to those of Spraggon (2002).
Spatial differences and a nutrient transport model (QUAL2K) are
incorporated into the experiment to simulate the physical environment (Chapra et al. 2008) (also discussed in Supplemental Materials S2.3).
A session of the experiment is composed of multiple groups.
Each group is composed of six student participants who play
the role of agents making production decisions in a common watershed. The production by agents occurs on specific parcels, which
are located linearly along a river: Parcel 1 is the farthest upstream
and Parcel 6 is the farthest downstream (Fig. 1). The spatially
explicit positioning of the agents has parallels to lab and field experiments that have explored the differences in water-use decisions
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Fig. 1. Spatial location of experimental design.

of upstream and downstream irrigators (D’Exelle et al. 2012; Bell
et al. 2015).
The agents in the experiment make decisions over a series
of rounds, using a web-browser-based interface built into the
Python package Willow (Weel and McCabe 2015). In every
round, the six agents simultaneously make production decisions
that determine their private incomes. Agents’ production creates
byproducts (pollution) that enter a river and cause damage to hypothetical downstream users. A principal, representing an environmental regulator, penalizes or rewards each agent based on the
measured ambient (group) pollution level at a downstream monitoring point (sensor) that results from the production decisions of
all upstream agents.
The measurement of the pollution level occurs at specific
sensors and is assumed to be measured over an interval of time,
referred to here as a sensing window. The sensing window in a
given round occurs after the production decisions of each of the
agents are complete. Specifically, the sensing window starts from
the time the pollution enters the stream and lasts until pollution
concentrations at the sensors reach a steady state. The effect of
an individual production decision on the observed concentration
at the sensors depends on all agents’ production decisions, their
locations, and the frequency of the sensing measurements. Given
the non-point-source pollution motivation for the study, the agents
cannot observe the behavior of other agents and the regulator cannot observe the individual agents’ actions, just the ambient level of
pollution measured at the sensors.
Each agent’s profit in a round is composed of the income they
earn from production, adjusted by any tax or subsidy imposed by
the principal according to pre-established policy rules. These rules
are communicated to the agents in the experiment instructions
(Supplemental Material). The income functions of the six agents
are identical (indexed by n ¼ 1; : : : ; 6). The income function is
quadratic in the agent’s production level, which is the decision variable, xn , and takes the form of Eq. (1)
I n ðxn Þ ¼ 35 − 0.0075ð50 − xn Þ2 ;

for n ¼ 1; : : : ; 6

ð1Þ

where I n = private income of agent n in a given round. The decision
variable, xn , can take on values between 0 and 50.
The amount of pollution byproduct generated by the agent is
proportional to their production level (it is assumed that 1 unit
of production leads to 1,000 μgN=L emissions of nitrite), and
the pollution concentration over time at one point in the river is
determined jointly by all agents’ decisions. Each round is independent, and pollution concentrations do not transfer across rounds.
The tax/subsidy that applies in each round is a linear function
© ASCE

of the measured pollutant concentration and is therefore contingent
on the production decisions of all agents. The tax/subsidy takes the
form of Eq. (2a) if there is only one sensor placed just downstream
of the last parcel
TSðx1 ; : : : ; x6 Þ ¼ 10ðThreshold − Cðx1 ; : : : ; x6 ÞÞ

ð2aÞ

where TS ðx1 ; : : : ; x6 Þ = tax/subsidy that is charged on an individual agent; and C ðx1 ; : : : ; x6 Þ = measured concentration of pollution. However, if there is one additional sensor placed between
Parcels 3 and 4, the tax/subsidy takes the form of Eq. (2b)

TSup ðx1 ; x2 ; x3 Þ ¼ 10ðThresholdup − Cðx1 ; x2 ; x3 ÞÞ
TSdown ðx4 ; x5 ; x6 Þ ¼ 10ðThresholddown − Cðx4 ; x5 ; x6 ÞÞ

ð2bÞ

where TSup ðx1 ; x2 ; x3 Þ = tax/subsidy that is charged to an individual agent from Parcels 1 to 3; Cðx1 ; x2 ; x3 Þ = measured concentration of pollution from the sensor between Parcels 3 and 4;
TSdown ðx4 x5 ; x6 Þ = tax/subsidy that is charged to an individual
agent from Parcels 4 to 6; and Cðx4 ; x5 ; x6 Þ = measured concentration of pollution from the downstream sensor. The thresholds in
Eqs. (2a) and (2b) are exogenous concentration levels determined
by the principal (regulator). The thresholds are different across
treatments and are designed such that average TS is approximately
zero when each agent chooses a production level of 25. The target
production level of 25 is assumed to be determined exogenously
and is not a product of the economic model. When TS is negative,
the agents pay a tax; otherwise, they receive a subsidy.
The profit earned by an individual participant in a given round is
the sum of private income [Eq. (1)] and the tax/subsidy in that
round [Eq. (2)]. When the measured pollution concentration is
greater than the threshold, TS is negative and therefore the participants’ realized profits in that round are lower than their private
income.
The amount of pollution generated by each agent is assumed to
enter the river simultaneously and then mix together, flow downstream, and dissipate. In other words, the pollution becomes less
concentrated as it spreads across a larger area. Although based
on the sum of pollution generated by each agent, there are nonlinear
effects that can increase pollution concentrations as contaminates
flow downstream through nitrification. The nutrient transport
model QUAL2K is here calibrated to simulate water flow and
the diffusion of the nitrite that is produced by agents and other
background nutrients (details can be found in Supplemental Materials S2). In this specification, a nitrification process is observed
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One sensor, low frequency
One sensor, high frequency
Two sensors, low frequency
Two sensors, high frequency

Number
of sensors

Frequency
of sensing

Ambient tax/
subsidy

1
1
2
2

Low
High
Low
High

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

that causes upstream parcels to have a large effect on the measured
concentration, whereas downstream parcels have smaller effects.
This specification simulates river ecosystems with larger residence
times of nutrients, such as the Delaware River and lower Mississippi River systems.
Due to the model’s complexity, experiment participants were
not provided with the specific analytical relationship between
the concentration of the pollutant in the river and their production
decisions. However, the instructions provided numerical examples,
and the computer screen included a calculator to help the participants understand the effects of their decisions. The participants
were given ample time to use the calculator to enter hypothetical
production levels for each parcel and then observe the resulting
measured concentration, tax/subsidy, and profits.
The pollution damage (social cost) was assumed to happen
immediately downstream from Parcel 6, and the degree of damage
is determined by the maximum concentration of the pollutant that is
observed during the sensing window. Specifically, the damage
function takes the form of Eq. (3)
Dðx1 ; : : : ; x6 Þ ¼ −10Cmax ðx1 ; : : : ; x6 Þ

ð3Þ

where Dðx1 ; : : : ; x6 Þ = economic damage; and Cmax ðx1 ; : : : ; x6 Þ =
maximum concentration, within the sensing window, just downstream of Parcel 6. The net social benefit takes the form of Eq. (4)
NSB ¼

6
X
n¼1

½35 − 0.0075ð50 − xn Þ2  − 10Cmax ðx1 ; : : : ; x6 Þ ð4Þ

Table 1 describes the four treatments, which differ in terms of
the number of sensors and frequency of sensing. In the first two
treatments, there is one sensor located just downstream of Parcel
6; in last two treatments, there is a sensor located just downstream
of Parcel 6 and another located just downstream of Parcel 3.
In terms of sensing frequency, the two low-frequency treatments
involve the least monitoring—one time during the sensing
window—and the tax/subsidy is calculated based on the measured
pollutant concentration. In the two treatments with high-frequency
sensing, sensors measure the pollutant concentration four times
randomly chosen during the sensing window, and the tax/subsidy
is determined based on the maximum concentration measured. A
status quo (control) treatment is also included in the experiment in
which there is no policy or sensor intervention. Two additional
treatments with continuous sensing were also played but are

excluded from the analysis in this paper due to the possibility
of multiple Nash equilibria.
The socially optimal production is a vector of production decisions at each parcel x1 ; : : : ; x6 that maximizes the net social benefit
in Eq. (4) and is displayed in the last row of Table 2. The Nash
equilibria (NE) for each parcel for the control (status quo) and
the four treatments are also presented in Table 2. The Nash equilibria are calculated based on the assumption that every agent will
maximize their private expected payoff given the decisions of other
agents. In every equilibrium, each agent has no better strategy
(production decision) to maximize the expected payoff given the
behaviors of other agents. Since a numeric nutrient transportation
model is used in this study, it is not possible to get analytical Nash
equilibria solutions, and therefore solve for the Nash equilibria
numerically (Supplemental Materials S2.2 provides the method).
As illustrated in Table 2, the NE primarily differ due to the frequency of sensing, which determines the expected magnitude of
the tax/subsidy. By design, the number of sensors does not have
a large impact on the NE, but the number of agents that can impact
the tax/subsidy is influenced by the number of sensors. Under the
calibrated stream and pollution dynamics, the optimal total emissions across all agents is 200, with heterogeneity across agents
based on spatial location. Specifically, emissions from upstream
parcels have a larger effect on the maximum concentration than
downstream parcels. Optimally, the farthest downstream parcel
(Parcel 6) has the highest emissions whereas the parcel farthest upstream (Parcel 1) has the lowest emissions.
Experiment Implementation
A total of 108 undergraduate students (18 groups of six) participated in six experimental sessions at an experimental laboratory
at the University of Delaware. Each student was randomly assigned
to a computer station before entering the lab. The assigned computer determines their initial group membership and their parcel
location along the river.
In the experiment, each agent faces every treatment (a withinsubject design) and each treatment consists of six rounds. In each
round, agents make one production decision, and then they are
shown a screen with the measured level of pollution, the tax/subsidy,
and their total profit. Each subject’s location (Parcels 1–6) changes
randomly between treatments, and the groups are rearranged between treatments to reduce group experience effects. The order of
the treatments is also varied across six experimental sessions to
reduce potential order effects. At the beginning of the session,
subjects are allowed 15 min to read the first part of the instructions
(Supplemental Material). Next, they watch a PowerPoint presentation to ensure their comprehension of the tax/subsidy and underlying
pollution-diffusion model. Additional instructions and presentations are offered at the beginning of each treatment. For the results
reported in this study, sessions lasted approximately 90 min, and
participant earnings were directly determined by the profits that they

Table 2. Predicted (Nash equilibrium) and socially optimal production levels for each parcel
Treatment
One sensor, low frequency
One sensor, high frequency
Two sensors, low frequency
Two sensors, high frequency
Status quo
Social optimum
© ASCE

Parcel 1

Parcel 2

Parcel 3

Parcel 4

Parcel 5

Parcel 6

33.5
21.8
33.3
22
50
20

33.4
22.8
33.3
20.2
50
24

33.3
28.5
33.3
29
50
30

33.3
36.5
33.3
38.4
50
33

33.3
44.6
33.3
45
50
44

33.3
48.8
33.3
48.9
50
49
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earned over the course of the sessions. On average, participants received $29 in earnings at the end of the experiment.
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Cluster Analysis
The objective of the experiment is to observe behavioral responses
to differences in the placement and frequency of sensors, when
used in conjunction with financial incentives related to water
quality. Cluster analysis is used to classify participants into distinct
behavioral types. Then, using the behavioral types identified by the
cluster analysis, MMNL models, described in the next subsection,
are used to analyze how the treatment conditions impact the behavioral types. The results from the MMNL modeling allow the three
introduced hypotheses to be empirically addressed.
Cluster analysis is a method for identifying heterogeneous
classes/groups among subjects where subjects within each class/
group display similar behavior and subjects between classes/groups
exhibit distinct behavior (Anderberg 1973; Hastie et al. 2001;
Johnson and Wichern 2002; Berry and Linoff 1997; Everitt 2011).
It is particularly useful when a priori knowledge regarding the number of behavioral types or the type structure is not available. To
explore heterogeneity of agent behavior, cluster analysis is
applied to segment the agents into distinct behavioral types using
the difference between an agent’s actual production decision and
the NE as a measure of the agent’s behavior in each round, shown
in Eq. (5)
diff t ¼ productiont − Nash equilibrium

ð5Þ

where t = round in which the decision is made. Thus, six observations are obtained for each subject in each treatment, designated
diff 1 , diff 2 , diff 3 , diff 4 , diff 5 , and diff 6 representing the differences
in each of the six periods. The cluster analysis is then implemented
based on the six observations together to segment the subjects. That
is, the distance matrix between two subjects used in the cluster
analysis is calculated with all six observations. This allows for possibly capturing subjects’ changing behavior over time, although the
empirical results show that agent decisions are largely consistent
over the six rounds.
Three common clustering methods are considered: the Gaussian
mixture model, K-means clustering, and hierarchical clustering.
Because there is no objectively correct clustering algorithm for
a particular problem, the most appropriate clustering method is typically selected, experimentally, based on the specific structure of
the data (Estivill-Castro 2002; Keritino et al. 2015). After model
diagnostics, it was found that the Gaussian mixture model does
not satisfy the required normality assumption. Several statistics
were then computed, such as the Calinski and Harabasz index
(or variance ratio criterion, Calinski and Harabasz 1974),
Krzanowski-Lai (KL) index (Krzanowski and Lai 1988), and Scattering and Dispersion (SD) validity index (Halkidi et al. 2000), to
evaluate the goodness of fit of the hierarchical and K-means methods. For example, the Calinski and Harabasz (CH) index measures
the ratio of between-group variation to within-group variation. A
good clustering method will create within-group subjects as similar
as possible and between-group subjects as dissimilar as possible.
Therefore, a large CH index is indicative of good clustering.
The Calinski and Harabasz index of the hierarchical clustering
in this study is 208.94, which is higher than 38.76 of the K-means
method, indicating that the hierarchical method has a better goodness of fit. The other statistics in general suggest similar results.
Henceforth, only the key results derived from hierarchical clustering are described.
© ASCE

Mixed-Effects Multinomial Logistic Regression
Analysis
To study possible varying effects of sensor and incentive conditions
on heterogeneous agent behavior and to test the Hypotheses 1–3,
MMNL models are estimated using the results from the cluster
analysis. The MMNL model was introduced by Boyd and Mellman
(1980) and Cardell and Dunbar (1980) in the economic literature.
Since then, various economic studies have improved or applied the
MMNL model for data analysis (e.g., Beggs 1988; Enberg et al.
1990; Reader 1993; Jain et al. 1994; Revelt and Train 1998; Train
1998; Nevo 2001; Small and Verhoef 2007; Fiebig et al. 2010). The
MMNL model is a generalization of the multinomial logistic model
and thus it can handle multilevel categorical or discrete response
variables. It measures the relationship between a multilevel
categorical response and one or more independent variables
(predictors) and can be used to predict the probabilities of the different possible outcomes of the response based on a logistic function of the linear combinations of the predictors. In addition, it can
capture repeated measurement information and heterogeneity in the
population by specifying random effects in model fitting.
In this study’s analysis, the data are fit with a categorical
response Y ¼ f1; 2; : : : ; Kg, representing the behavioral groups
estimated from the hierarchical clustering algorithm, and then
the conditional probabilities of the agents’ type of behavior are predicted given the experimental treatments (policy, sensors, and frequency of sensing) and array of spatial locations. The clustering
algorithm (results described subsequently) identifies four groups,
e.g., K ¼ 4. Interactions between the treatments and the locations
(a full factorial design) are also considered when fitting the model.
The experiment sessions and rounds are treated as random effects
because there might be heterogeneous structures associated with
the two variables.
The model is mathematically formulated by introducing the following notation. Parcels, policy, sensors, and monitoring frequency
are all categorical variables. Dummy (indicator) variables are used
to represent each category of the variables. Let z1 ; z2 ; : : : ; z5 denote
the indicator variables for Parcels 1 to 5. Let z6 denote the indicator
variable for policy and z7 denote the indicator variable for two sensors and measure the additional effect due to two sensors. Let z8
denote the indicator variable for high frequency, let z9 ; z10 ; : : : ; z13
denote the indicator variables for the interactions between parcel
numbers and policy, let z14 ; z15 ; : : : ; z18 denote the indicator variables for the interactions between parcel numbers and two sensors,
let z19 ; z20 ; : : : ; z23 denote the indicator variables for the interactions between parcel numbers and high frequency, and let z24 denote the interaction for two sensors and high frequency. Parcel 6 is
not in the model formulation because it is treated as a baseline.
In addition, let β i;1 ; β i;2 ; : : : ; β i;24 , i ¼ 2; 3; 4, denote the coefficients of the corresponding variables in the multinomial logistic
model. For convenience, let [Z] be the predictor vector that contains
elements z1 ; z2 ; : : : ; z24 , and β i , i ¼ 2; 3; 4, be the coefficient
vectors that contain elements β i;1 ; β i;2 ; : : : ; β i;24 , respectively.
Let μi , i ¼ 2; 3; 4, denote the intercepts. Eq. (6) describes the
fixed-effect specifications. Random effects are omitted in the formulation because they mainly affect the variance but not the mean
function
log

PrðY ¼ iÞ
¼ μi þ β i;1 z1 þ · · · þβ i;24 z24 ¼ β i0 Z;
PrðY ¼ 1Þ

i ¼ 2; 3; 4
ð6Þ

Therefore, the predicted probabilities for the four behavioral
group types can be calculated by Eq. (7)
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Table 3. Mean differences in production levels relative to the NE, by clusters
Cluster 1: competitive
(216 agents)

Variable

Cluster 2: cooperative
(171 agents)

−0.23
−2.02
−1.34
−1.97
−2.31
−3.36

Diff1
Diff2
Diff3
Diff4
Diff5
Diff6

−14.71
−11.95
−12.40
−10.78
−9.07
−8.83

−26.06
−28.01
−28.42
−27.83
−25.26
−24.22

0
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PrðY ¼ iÞ ¼

Cluster 3: hypercooperative
(51 agents)

eβ i Z
0
0 ;
β 20 Z
1 þ e þ e β 3 Z þ eβ 4 Z

i ¼ 2; 3; 4

ð7Þ

Results
This section describes the results of the cluster analysis and MMNL
model estimated using the decisions made in the experiment. The
cluster analysis is designed to separate the participants in each treatment into unique groups based on the production decisions they
make. The MMNL model then describes how the treatment and
other features of the experiment impact the behavioral types identified in the cluster analysis, which allows the three identified
behavioral hypotheses to be addressed.
Cluster Analysis
The hierarchical clustering analysis provides a four-group partition,
suggesting four agent behavior types. The group (cluster) mean difference in production relative to the NE are given in Table 3. An
agent’s behavior is defined relative to the NE. The NE for an agent
is their privately optimal production decision in the game, provided
all other agents are also playing their own optimal production decision. That is, agents are best responding to others’ best response.
The terms competitive and cooperative are used as labels to categorize agent behavior relative to the NE. As indicated in Table 3,
Cluster 1 (competitive) behavior was, on average, closest to the
NE. Clusters 2 (cooperative) and 3 (hypercooperative) chose lower
than NE levels of production (and thus lower pollution), on average, and Cluster 3 tended to select the lowest production. Cluster 4

Cluster 4: hypercompetitive
(102 agents)
6.91
7.56
7.32
8.67
8.49
7.05

(hypercompetitive), on average, chose production decisions that exceeded the NE.
Fig. 2 looks further at the data distribution within each cluster.
Because the agent decisions (differences from NE) are largely consistent over the six rounds, the data distributions are very similar
over time. To make the graphical illustration simple, the information was averaged over time for each agent and the distribution of
the averaged differences for each cluster are summarized by a boxplot in Fig. 2. The bold line in the middle of each boxplot represents
the median value of the (averaged) differences from the NE for the
group, the horizontal lines on the top and bottom of each plot represent the maximum and minimum values of the cluster excluding
outliers, and the circles represent outliers.
It can be seen from Fig. 2 that Cluster 4 generally produces more
than the NE because the differences of the cluster are above zero.
This class of agents is therefore characterized as hypercompetitive.
Cluster 1 agents are closest to the NE because the median value of
the cluster is closest to zero. These agents are characterized as competitive/selfish. In contrast, Cluster 2 and Cluster 3 are generally
below zero, indicating that the agents in these two groups produce
consistently below the NE, and the agents in Cluster 3 fall the farthest below. Therefore, Cluster 2 and Cluster 3 agents are characterized as cooperative/altruistic and hypercooperative, respectively.
The information shown in these plots is consistent with the average
per-cluster values presented in Table 3.
Fig. 3 shows the probability density functions of the four behavioral groups distributed under experimental control (status quo) and
treatment conditions. Although approximately 83% of agents chose
a competitive behavioral strategy predicted by the NE under the
control status quo condition, the treatments induce increases in
cooperative behaviors. The four behavioral groups derived from
hierarchical cluster analysis are then used as response variables
in the multinomial logistic regression analysis to investigate heterogeneous covariate effects and are further predicted by tunable conditions represented in the experimental treatments, parcel numbers,
and their interactions.
Hypothesis Testing

Fig. 2. Box plots of differences to Nash equilibria for the four behavioral groups.
© ASCE

Table 4 presents the estimated results from the MMNL model,
which was selected based on the minimization of the Bayesian
information criterion (BIC) across a suite of six different model
specifications shown in the Supplemental Material. Models with
different random effects specifications are compared across and
with a null model (no random effects), as indicated in Table S1.
It is found that the multilevel model that controls for sessions as
random effects and includes a full factorial of interaction effects
of experimental treatments with parcels is the model that best fits
the data. The estimated coefficients from this best-fit model are provided in Table 4. The results indicate that the spatial location
(whether a parcel is upstream or downstream of a sensor),
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Fig. 3. Distribution of strategic behavioral clusters by treatment.

Table 4. Estimated fixed-effect coefficients (exponents of log-odds) from the MMNL model (base group = competitive, Cluster 1)
Variable
Intercept
Parcel 1
Parcel 2
Parcel 3
Parcel 4
Parcel 5
Policy
Two sensors
High frequency
Parcel 1 × policy
Parcel 2 × policy
Parcel 3 × policy
Parcel 4 × policy
Parcel 5 × policy
Parcel 1 × two sensors
Parcel 2 × two sensors
Parcel 3 × two sensors
Parcel 4 × two sensors
Parcel 5 × two sensors
Parcel 1 × high frequency
Parcel 2 × high frequency
Parcel 3 × high frequency
Parcel 4 × high frequency
Parcel 5 × high frequency
Two sensors × high frequency

Cooperative (Cluster 2)

Hypercooperative (Cluster 3)

Hypercompetitive (Cluster 4)

0.0597***
1.0194
3.2563**
2.0763
2.0628
5.0860***
53.2394***
0.4036**
0.6592
1.0173
0.2776**
0.3712**
0.1315***
0.1724**
0.8738
0.6647
1.5380
4.8710***
2.6195**
0.3418**
0.2266***
0.4760**
2.5075**
1.0799
0.8804

0.0001
463.1727
0.1430
0.1425
0.1423
599.9222
8738.554
0.0472***
2.1316**
0.0016
3.1205
8.0437
5.5118
1.12 × 10−7
6.7957**
6.0206**
15.1272***
13.1707***
25.348***
0.0338***
1.28 × 10−6
0.0068***
0.1527***
1254.51
5.6598***

4.33 × 10−11 ***
0.0698
0.0656***
0.0705
0.0702***
0.0501***
4670.000
0.2277***
0.0008
3.6096
0.6769
7.0202
2.5271
6.6352
11.4386***
32.3948***
1.6714
14.8277***
13.8059***
4685.838
11316.31
1043.254
5706.151
819.4226
0.3081***

Note: *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.05; and * p < 0.01. Sessions are controlled to account for random effects. Some large coefficients are due to exponential
transformation.

frequency of sensing, number of sensors, and policy all affect the
likelihood of an agent playing cooperatively or competitively.
Fig. 4 shows MMNL predicted marginal probabilities for all
four behavioral groups in relation to four experimental predictors—
policy (whether the tax/subsidy policy is in place), parcel ID, sensors, and frequency of sensing—while all other predictor variables
in the MMNL are held constant at their mean values. The existence
of the incentive-based policy increases the probability of
© ASCE

cooperative behavior. Agents in upstream Parcels 1, 2, and 3 are
more likely to be competitive and less likely to be cooperative compared with the agents in downstream parcels. The addition of one
sensor (with policy) increases the marginal likelihood of cooperative behavior but diminishes this likelihood with another sensor. Finally, low frequency of sensing induces a higher marginal
likelihood of cooperative behavior than higher frequency of
sensing.
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Fig. 4. Predicted marginal probabilities of four behavioral groups for four experimental predictors: policy (tax/subsidy), parcel ID, sensors, and
frequency of sensing.

Hypothesis 1: Incentives Induce Cooperative Behavior
among Agents
The results from the MMNL reveal that existence of policy
(incentive manipulation) increases the likelihood of cooperative
behavior. For example, when policy exists, the odds of cooperative
behavior relative to competitive behavior are about 53 times higher
as the odds without policy (p < 0.001) for agents at Parcel 6
and about 7–53 times higher for agents at other parcels (multiplication of the coefficient of policy by the coefficient of interaction).
But policy alone (without increasing the number of sensors
and frequency of sensing) does not significantly affect the
likelihood of extreme behavior (hypercooperative or hypercompetitive).
Most significantly, the effects of interactions of policy with
the parcel dummy variables (Table 4) are significant for the cooperative group, indicating that policy has heterogonous influence
among parcels. In particular, the odds of cooperative behavior
relative to competitive behavior tend to be smaller for agents
of Parcels 2, 3, 4, and 5 (p < 0.001) compared with Parcel 6.
However, the interaction terms are not significant for the extreme
types of behavior (both hypercooperative or hypercompetitive).
These results support the conclusion that policy incentives
generally induce cooperative behavior, but the effect also depends
on the location of the agent’s parcel in the river network. Policy can
induce competitive behavior in upstream agents, but the farthest
downstream agents tend to display a greater likelihood of
cooperative behavior.
© ASCE

Hypothesis 2: Number of Water Quality Sensors as
Well as Their Sensing Frequency Influence
Cooperative Behavior
After controlling for the location of agents, it is found that both the
number of sensors and the frequency of sensing generally affect the
likelihood of cooperative behavior. Adding one sensor (with a policy) has a relatively large effect on inducing cooperative behavior
(the odds of cooperative behavior relative to competitive behavior
are about 7–53 times higher than those without a policy across the
six parcels). The size of the effect diminishes with the addition of a
second sensor (the odds are reduced to about 40% for Parcel 6 and
more or less for other parcels compared with the one-sensor case,
although the odds are still higher than those without a policy). It is
also found that one sensor (with a policy) in the river network does
not significantly affect the behavior of the extreme types of agents
(hypercooperative and hypercompetitive). However, adding a second sensor (low frequency) reduces the odds of hypercooperative
behavior relative to competitive behavior for most agents except
those at Parcel 5, whose odds are not changed much. Meanwhile,
the additional sensor decreases the odds of hypercompetitive behavior for agents spatially close to the sensors (Parcels 3 and 6,
p < 0.001) but increases the odds for agents farther from the sensors.
Changes in the frequency of sensing produce some surprising
results. A high frequency of sensing (four times) reduces the odds
of cooperative behavior versus competitive behavior compared
with a low frequency of sensing (once), especially for upstream
agents (further reduced to about 22.7%–47.6% in comparison with
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Parcel 6), although it still increases the odds of cooperative behavior in comparison to the control group (no policy). Moreover, sensing frequency affects the behavior of the extreme types of agents.
A high frequency of sensing increases the odds of hypercooperative behavior versus competitive behavior for farther downstream
agents (e.g., a 2.1 times increase for Parcel 6) but decreases the
odds of hypercooperative behavior for upstream agents. When
high-frequency sensing is coupled with two sensors, the odds of
hypercooperative behavior for downstream agents are further increased (e.g., about 5.7 times for Parcel 6), but the odds of the upstream agents are still lower than those under two sensors and a low
frequency of sensing. On the other hand, a high frequency of sensing with two sensors reduces the odds of hypercompetitive behavior versus competitive behavior for agents spatially closer to the
sensors (Parcels 3, 5, and 6) but increases the odds for agents farther from the sensors, again compared with two sensors and a low
frequency of sensing.
From these results, it can be concluded that a minimal amount of
sensing in addition to incentive manipulation can have large and
statistically significant effects in increasing cooperative behavior.
An increased number of sensors and frequency of sensing can reduce the likelihood of hypercompetitive behavior for agents closer
to the sensors but is not as effective for agents farther from the
sensors.
Hypothesis 3: Spatial Locations of the Agents Relative
to the Spatial Locations of the Sensors Affect the
Induction of Cooperative Behavior
The effects of the interaction between the sensing variables and the
parcel dummy variables demonstrate that the spatial location of a
non-point-source polluter relative to the sensors in a river network
matters. Generally, it was found that when one or two sensors
are added, agents of all six parcels are more likely to behave cooperatively, but the effect on inducing cooperative behavior is
smaller for agents of upstream parcels than for agents of the parcels
farthest downstream. Additionally, the interaction of a high frequency of sensing and the parcel location demonstrates the complex heterogeneity of the location effects for cooperative and
hypercooperative agents. A high frequency of sensing tends to decrease the odds of cooperative behavior and hypercooperative
behavior (versus competitive behavior) for upstream agents,
but may increase or reduce less the odds for downstream agents
(e.g., a 2.1 times increase of hypercooperative behavior for
Parcel 6). This is likely because the NE level of production is significantly higher for downstream parcels in the high-frequency
sensing treatments.
Overall, the authors conclude that sensors paired with incentives increase the likelihood of cooperative behavior in all parcels, but the size of the effect on inducing cooperation is slightly
larger in downstream parcels compared with upstream parcels.
Moreover, a high frequency of sensing is likely to reduce cooperative and hypercooperative behavior in upstream parcels
although it might increase or reduce these behaviors in downstream
parcels.

Discussion
There are broad (1) watershed management and policy, and
(2) decision behavioral and game theoretical implications of the
results presented in this paper that are discussed in this section.
Methodological limitations are also discussed.
© ASCE

Watershed Management and Policy Implications
Overall, the incentive-based policy was found to induce cooperative
behavior, and a low frequency of sensing with the incentives in place
can have large effects on increasing cooperative behaviors. Minimal
investments in setting up advanced environmental monitoring/
sensing systems can potentially have large effects in improving
water quality. The experimental data, however, also show that increasing the number of sensors (from one to two sensors) and frequency of sensing (from low to high) does not necessarily increase
cooperative behavior. This finding suggests that additional sensors
and frequency of sensing may diminish the likelihood of cooperative
behavior in maintaining water quality; however, they may reduce the
likelihood of extreme behavior.
This implication needs to be further tested in a more elaborate
game design and with more levels of the frequency of sensing.
More elaborate watershed-scale field experiments and agent-based
models can be used in future studies to ascertain the extent and
scale of these sensing effects, both with and without incentive
manipulation. Such studies may enable identification of optimal
environmental monitoring and sensor network designs in specific
watershed management and policy design contexts. For enhanced
ability to draw general conclusions, future research may change
assumptions in the nutrient dynamics model that is used to simulate
pollution concentration (and hence damages from pollution). For
example, the model in this study assumes large constant background loadings into the surface water system. It may be interesting
to modify the parameters to reduce the background loading; this
may enhance the diffusion effect and alter how pollutants from different parcels diffuse over time, thereby changing polluters’ incentives across space.
Behavioral Implications
Spatially explicit social dilemma and principal agent games, a
variant of which has been presented in this study, can generate
useful insights about the design of incentive mechanisms and
sensor monitoring systems in the management and governance of
human–environmental systems. Incorporation of spatially sensitive
upstream and downstream dynamics in the management of nonpoint-source polluters, in particular design of environmental monitoring systems and incentive mechanisms, can be adapted to
specific watershed topologies and stream networks. For example,
the authors found that when one or two sensors are added (coupled
with policy), agents of all six parcels were more likely to behave
cooperatively, but the effect on inducing cooperative behavior was
smaller for agents of upstream parcels than for agents of the parcel
farthest downstream agents. Further, under a high frequency of
sensing, agents of downstream parcels tended to perform more cooperatively than agents of upstream parcels. Conversely, a lack of
sensing and absence of incentive manipulation likely leads to more
predictable Nash/competitive behaviors.
Location of players vis-a-vis sensor locations matters significantly in inducing cooperative versus competitive strategies. More
specific watershed-scale studies need to be designed to tease out the
location-specific effects of installing environmental monitoring
sensor systems across upstream and downstream gradients. Experimental results from this study confirm the value of installing cyberinfrastructure through monitoring and sensor systems, but more
studies, ideally with spatially explicit dynamic social dilemma
game structures, could improve current understanding of the location effects of sensors on non-point-source polluters in the management of watersheds.
The power of advanced in situ sensor networks to provide water
quality data to support science-based decisions by stakeholders and
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resource managers appears intuitive and compelling. As discussed
in terms of the results of this experimental study, other similar
behavioral and game theoretical studies (mentioned in the “Introduction”) have suggested that the responses of private individuals
and businesses to more detailed and accurate environmental information is variable and complex. Sensor-based water quality information can be gathered more often, accommodate a greater number
of dimensions, have a higher resolution and/or accuracy, and cover
a larger geographic and temporal environmental or social scope.
Each of these factors can change human behavior, and the underlying premise may be that such changes in behavior will lead to a
more sustainable use of natural resources. However, a behavioral
change across the complex spatial terrains of watersheds in response to a given change in information is not guaranteed. Prior
research, for example, has found that social information that can
be interpreted as normative (such as choices of peers) can have
strong and lasting effects on inducing cooperative behaviors
(e.g., environmental conservation), perhaps stronger and longer
lasting than the frequency or dimensional richness of scientifically
measured environmental information (Dennis et al. 1990; Nolan
et al. 2008; Peschiera and Taylor 2012). Location also matters, because the interaction effect of incentive mechanisms of resource
users with sensor locations used by watershed managers has a
strong effect in steering the multiscale environmental conditions.
Other studies in groundwater management, irrigation, and energy conservation domains investigating the effects of sensor information on strategic behaviors have found similar effects. For
instance, greater availability of information regarding the condition
of an aquifer could lead farmers to increase their water withdrawals
in the short run at the expense of future water availability (Li et al.
2014). That could lead to lower seasonal water levels and overcapitalized farmers (e.g., Molden et al. 2003; Cosgrove and Rijsberman
2014). Similarly, provision of information that the level of pollution
in a water body is low could encourage some farmers to forgo
expensive pollution-abatement activities. In irrigation games,
Bell et al. (2015) found that upstream players in the Indus Basin,
whose water supply was unaffected by scarcity, did not change their
competitive behavior in response to information that downstream
players were not receiving adequate water. In contrast, D’Exelle
et al. (2012) found that upstream irrigation players in Tanzania
played cooperatively for enabling equitable sharing of water resources between upstream and downstream players. Studies of residential energy consumption have shown that more frequent
provisions of usage and cost information can lead to declines in
energy use (Petersen et al. 2007), but more frequent information
often does not improve behavior or improves it only temporarily
(Abrahamse et al. 2005).
Moreover, information that covers a larger spatial scale could
have unintended spatial effects. For instance, information regarding high pollution levels in upper reaches of a watershed could
discourage farmers in lower reaches from adopting conservation
practices. Likewise, owners of lakefront homes could forgo adopting best management practices to control runoff or maintain septic
systems if they view actions of their neighbors as making their
individual actions irrelevant. People also sometimes misinterpret
the risks associated with such information. For example, information that fosters new media reports regarding high levels of E. coli
could lead to visitors shunning previously popular tourist destinations because they believe they are no longer safe even though the
objective degree of risk has not changed. Broader decision behavior and game theoretic research in the future across a variety of
watershed management conditions can explain the amplifying or
dampening effects of strategic behavioral responses to incentive
mechanisms and the placement of sensor monitoring systems.
© ASCE

Methodological Limitations
The proposed clustering method to isolate behavioral strategies as
a function of NE does not work well for situations that involve
multiple Nash equilibria. In such cases, distance from the NE may
yield nonunique solutions. In addition, both the NE and the production decisions can change across treatment settings. The cluster analysis is based on the distance between production choices
and relevant NE, and therefore the observed changes in behavioral
types across treatments and scenarios are due to both because of
changes in production decisions and changes in the NE. Future
research should evaluate the relative importance of each of these
avenues. Another important limitation of the game concerns the
theoretical assignment of cooperative behaviors to agents despite
the fact that agents do not see each other’s moves or production
levels. Treatments that enable communication between agents
were not tested in this experiment but represent a fruitful area
for future research (e.g., Guilfoos et al. 2019).
In addition, although logistic regression is a popular and effective approach for modeling categorical outcomes in classification
problems, the method still relies on certain assumptions. For
example, the model has a parametric formulation, and a linear
relationship between the log odds and the predictors is assumed
in the study. If these parametric assumptions are violated, the
model could be misspecified. The model was diagnosed based on
Pearson (chi-square) residuals, and severe violations were not observed. Because the dimension of the predictors in this study is
relatively high, the authors consider that the linear assumption is
relatively mild. Nevertheless, the conclusion is data-driven and
model-based. There are other nonparametric techniques for classification problems, such as decision trees and random forests,
which are worthy of future investigation. These methods are flexible and useful for the purpose of prediction but can be less
effective for interpretation.

Conclusion
This study investigated how monitoring and policy influence
heterogeneous agent behavior and found that policy coupled with
sensing information induces cooperative behavior, but the effect is
conditional on the location of the agent’s property in the river network. Upstream agents with relatively more influence on downstream ambient pollution display marginally greater likelihood
of behaving competitively, whereas downstream agents with relatively less influence on ambient pollution display marginally
greater likelihood of behaving cooperatively. However, policy
alone (without increasing number of sensors and frequency of sensing) does not significantly affect the likelihood of extreme behavior
(hypercooperative or hypercompetitive). Further, introduction of a
minimal amount of sensing with incentive manipulation can have
large significant effects in increasing cooperative behaviors. The
addition of another sensor or higher frequency of sensing does
not necessarily increase cooperative behavior. The implication here
is straightforward. Initial investments in sensor technologies that
make it feasible to provide financial incentives to producers that
are conditional on ambient pollution outcomes can generate significant reductions in water pollution. Additional investments in additional sensor locations or high-frequency sensors, however, may
not yield benefits in terms of improved water quality and therefore
are unlikely to be cost-effective.
In addition, there are important network effects to inducing cooperative behaviors, and those linkages through water and transport
flows need to be considered when designing water quality monitoring systems and incentive mechanisms. The complexities faced

04020054-10

J. Water Resour. Plann. Manage., 2020, 146(8): 04020054

J. Water Resour. Plann. Manage.

by agents in a watershed suggest that policy impacts on the type of
behavioral responses vary by spatial location, i.e., not just that incentives change across spatial location but that the responses to
those incentives are location-dependent as well. This implies that
a deeper understanding of the design of environmental monitoring
systems in relation to decision behavioral responses under specific
incentive mechanisms is needed for watershed management and
planning.
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